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TESTING THEORIES OF JOB CREATION: 




Although search-matching theory has come to dominate labor economics in recent years, few 
attempts have been made to compare the empirical relevance of search-matching theory to 
efficiency wage and bargaining theories, where employment is determined by labor demand. 
In this paper we formulate an empirical equation for net job creation, which encompasses 
search-matching theory and a standard labor demand model. Estimation on firm-level data 
yields support for the labor demand model, wages and product demand affect job creation, but 
we find no evidence that unemployed workers contribute to job creation, as predicted by 
search-matching theory. 
JEL Code: E24, J23, J64. 
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1. Introduction 
Efficiency wage and bargaining theories predict wages to be above the market clearing level.
1 
There is excess supply in the labor market, so firms can hire the workers they want. 
Unemployment is explained by too high wages and lack of demand. An increase in labor 
supply will increase employment only if wages fall, or there is some other factor that shifts 
labor demand.  
In the last two decades, these demand-oriented theories have been challenged by 
search-matching theory, where unemployment arises because it takes time for workers and 
firms to find each other.
2 Without such frictions, there would be no unemployment.  Search-
matching theory assigns a minor role to the demand side of the labor market. Instead, supply 
creates its own demand: if labor supply increases, firms open more vacancies and vacancies 
are filled more quickly. Importantly, this happens even if wages do not adjust.
3   
While search-matching theory has come to dominate labor economics in recent 
years, few attempts have been made to compare the empirical relevance of search-matching 
theory and theories where employment is determined by labor demand. The purpose of this 
paper is to compare the explanatory power of these two paradigms for thinking about 
(un)employment. More specifically, we focus on the question whether search-matching theory 
helps to explain job creation. Do unemployed workers contribute to job creation, as predicted 
by search-matching theory? Does supply create its own demand? 
All leading theories of the labor market imply that, in the long run, supply creates its 
own demand. If labor supply increases, this will eventually bring about more jobs. But labor 
market theories differ in their explanations of how this adjustment occurs and what drives 
medium-term variations in employment. Demand-oriented models point to wages and 
aggregate demand as key factors. Unemployed workers are available, waiting for work, but 
there are simply too few jobs to go around. In search-matching theory, unemployed workers 
are not just a passive ‘reserve army’ waiting for jobs, but their search activity contributes to 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Phelps (1968), Salop (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Oswald (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1986), 
Blanchard and Summers (1986), Gottfries and Horn (1987), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). Minimum 
wages is another reason why wages may be above the market clearing level. 
2 See e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). 
3 Suppose that the number of vacancies is determined by the zero profit condition  ) (w qJ c =  where c is the cost 
of keeping a vacancy J(w) is the  value of a filled job, and q is the probability to fill a vacancy. Let the latter be 
determined by 
α ) / ( V U m q = . Then we can solve for vacancies:  U c w mJ V
α / 1 ) / ) ( ( = . For a given wage, the 
number of vacancies is proportional to unemployment, and so is the number of matches. Assuming a constant 
separation rate and using the flow equilibrium condition, it is easy to show that if frictions are eliminated, i. e. c 
goes to zero or α  goes to infinity, unemployment will disappear.   2
matches being formed. This, in fact, is the essence of the matching function: hiring depends 
not only on the number of job openings, but also on unemployment.  
The novel prediction from search-matching theory is that an increase in 
unemployment should bring about more job creation even without any adjustment of wages. 
To test this prediction, we formulate an empirical equation for net job creation, which 
encompasses both theories, and estimate it on firm-level data. The equation includes firm-
specific measures of real wage cost per worker and product demand, as well as 
unemployment and vacancies in the local labor market area. The demand variable is 
constructed by weighing together international demand with domestic aggregate demand 
components using firm- and industry-specific weights.  
Turning to estimation, a basic identification problem arises. Aggregate shocks, 
which affect employment in all firms, will affect wages and aggregate demand as well as 
unemployment and vacancies. To deal with this problem, we include time dummies to capture 
unobserved shocks that affect all firms. There could also be local shocks, which affect all 
firms, and hence vacancies and unemployment, in a local labor market area. We therefore 
instrument local unemployment and vacancies by demand and price indexes, which reflect the 
industry structure in the local labor market area. The sample period is Sweden in the 1990s, a 
period with large fluctuations in domestic and international demand, as well as in the 
exchange rate, which should help to identify the effects of supply and demand factors on net 
job creation.  
The results provide strong support for demand-oriented theories of job creation. 
Wages and demand have statistically significant and quantitatively large effects on job 
creation. In contrast, unemployment does not have a significant effect on net job creation.
4  
Nor do we see any evidence of congestion effects when there are many vacancies in the local 
labor market. Apparently, search-matching theory offers little value added when it comes to 
explaining job creation in this period.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive equations for 
net job creation from two different models: a labor demand model with adjustment costs, and 
a search-matching model. We also formulate an encompassing empirical specification. In 
Section 3 we present the data and discuss identification and estimation issues. The results are 
presented in Section 4 and the relation other empirical studies is discussed in Section 5. 
 
                                                 
4 There is a lot of evidence that an increase in unemployment will lead to wage moderation, and this will increase 
employment, but this effect would arise in any labor market model that we know of.   3
2. Theories of Job Creation and an Empirical Specification  
Below we formulate two simple models of job creation: a labor demand model with 
adjustment costs and a search-matching model. The purpose is to clarify which factors 
determine job creation in each model and to highlight the differences between the two 
models. In both models, firms, indexed i, belong to different sectors and sell in different 
product markets, but hire in the same local labor market and take the wage as given.
5 
 
2.1  A Labor Demand Model with Adjustment Costs
6 
The wage is above the market clearing level and there are no search frictions, so firms can 
always hire the workers they want. The production function is  t i t i N Q , , = , where  t i Q ,  is 













=− +  where  , it D  is a firm-specific demand-shifter,  t i P,  is the price 
set by firm i,  ,
C
it P  is the average price level of the competitors of firm i in the relevant markets. 
, it D  and  ,
C
it P  are indexed i because firms belong to different sectors and sell in different 
markets.  t i, ν  is a firm-specific idiosyncratic i. i. d. demand shock. The shock is observed by 
the firm before it sets employment. It is costly for the firm to adjust its employment level, and 
the adjustment cost is given by 
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5 We do not model wage setting but we think of the wage as being predetermined because of union contracts and 
nominal wage rigidity. Forslund, Gottfries and Westermark (2006) find a very high degree of nominal wage 
rigidity in all four Nordic countries. What is needed, however, is that the wage does not depend on the 
employment decision. In the empirical implementation, we instrument for the wage to take account of possible 
simultaneity. 
6 Models of this type are analyzed by Sargent (1979), Nickell (1986), Hamermesh (1993), and others. It is 
presented here to simplify the comparison with the search-matching model.    4
where the wage in firm i is denoted  t i W , .
7  The first order condition for the optimal 
employment level in period t is a second-order difference equation from which we can derive 
the following equation for net job creation (see the Appendix):  
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∑ ,   (2) 
 
where  1 λ  and  2 λ  are functions of the parameters β , η  and c; 1 01 λ < <  and  1 2 > λ . Job 
growth in firm i is determined by demand and wage cost deflated by an index of competitors’ 
prices. In the following, we denote the latter variable “real wage cost” or “competitiveness.” 
Employment in the previous period enters as a state variable. 
 
2.2 A Search-Matching Model 
In the textbook search-matching model firms are identical and hire at most one worker. In 
reality, firms belong to different production sectors and sell in different markets, and most of 
them hire many workers. To derive an employment equation that can be implemented 
empirically, we consider a search-matching model with multi-employee firms facing different 
wages and prices. The model is a large-firm version of the standard search-matching model 
(e.g. Pissarides, 2000), except that we assume vacancy costs to be quadratic. This assumption 
is made to avoid the extreme – and counterfactual - implication that all vacancies are opened 
by the most profitable firm. 
Workers and firms are situated in local labor markets and they cannot move between 
markets. In each local labor market there is a large number of price-taking firms. Again, firms 
in a local labor market belong to different production sectors and sell in different markets, so 
they face different competitors’ prices,  ,
C
it P . Job destruction varies stochastically across firms. 
The timing of events is as follows:   
(i)  At the start of a period, firms choose the number of vacancies to open. Firm i opens 




it it Pc V .  
 
                                                 
7 To simplify the model, we assume that the adjustment cost is proportional to the competitors’ price and the 
firm also deflates future profits by this price.  With more realistic assumptions, we would have more relative 
prices entering the decision rule, but these effects would be hard to estimate empirically.   5
(ii)  Matching of previously unemployed workers  ,1 () nt U −  and total vacancies  , () nt V  
takes place in the local labor market, indexed n. The matching process between 
vacancies and unemployment is described by a conventional constant-returns 
matching function: 
1
,, 1 , nt nt nt M UV
α α −
− =  where  , nt M  is the total number of matches in 
period t.  Hence the probability of filling a vacancy is 
,, ,, 1 , /( / ) nt nt nt nt nt qM V UV
α
− == . 
(iii)  A firm-specific separation shock is realized. Total separations in firm i are given by 
( ) t i t i N , , ξ λ +  where the shock,  t i, ξ , is i.i.d with mean zero. 
(iv)  Production takes place. 
 
Firm i chooses vacancies so as to solve the following profit maximization problem: 
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At the optimum, the marginal cost of opening one more vacancy should be equal to the 
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8 Alternatively, this condition can be derived by substituting for vacancies in the objective function, maximizing 
with respect to expected employment, and iterating on the resulting difference equation (see the Appendix).   6
As in the labor demand model, job creation in a firm depends on the firm’s real wage cost. 
Furthermore, it increases with the level of unemployment for two reasons: high 
unemployment makes it easier to find workers and the firm also opens more vacancies. Job 
creation should decrease with the total number of vacancies in the local labor market because 
of congestion. It is harder for firm i to find workers when there are many vacancies in the 
local labor market. Again, the previous level of employment is a state variable. 
 
2.3. An Encompassing Empirical Specification 
Comparing the equations for job creation derived from our two models we see that real wage 
cost and the previous level of employment play a role in both. The key difference is that 
according to the labor demand model, demand is important for firms’ hiring decisions, while 
the search-matching model emphasizes labor supply. Unemployed workers contribute to job 
creation in the search-matching model. Since we want to investigate the relative importance 
these various factors, our baseline empirical specification encompasses both models: 
 
,1 , , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 1 , ln (ln ln ) ln ln ln ln .
C
it i it it it nt nt it it NW P D U V N α ββ β β β ε −− ∆= + −+ + + + +  (6) 
 
In the theoretical models above, employment depends on weighted averages of current and 
expected future real wage costs and demand. Since we have a rather short panel, we simply 
use current values and include extra lags if necessary in the empirical specification.
9 
Productivity growth is captured by time dummies. 
 Both  models  predict  1 0 β <  and  5 10 β − << . According to the labor demand model 
2 0 β > and  34 0 β β == , while the search-matching model implies  2 0 β = ,  3 0 β >  and  4 0 β < . 
We should note, however, that these differences arise because we made different assumptions 
in the two models about product and labor markets. In the labor demand model, the product 
market was assumed to be imperfectly competitive and there were no matching frictions in the 
labor market. In the search-matching model, the product market was assumed to be perfectly 
competitive and there were frictions in the labor market. These are the typical combinations 
considered in the literature. Most of the modern bargaining literature treats the product market 
as imperfectly competitive; it is the firm’s market power which creates the surplus, over 
                                                 
9 The period in the models is shorter than one year, which is the frequency of the data. Ideally we would like to 
have data on higher frequency, but given the high persistence in the explanatory variables, it is very unlikely that 
such data would lead to qualitatively different results.   7
which firms and insiders/unions bargain.
10 Almost all search-matching models treat product 
markets as perfectly competitive, downplaying the role of demand factors.
11  
  There are other combinations, however, e.g. efficiency wage models with perfect 
competition in the product market (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) and search-matching models 
with imperfect competition in the product market (Ebell and Haefke (2004)). Thus we can 
have  2 0 β >  in a search-matching model and we should be aware that  2 β  sheds light on the 
nature of product market competition rather than matching frictions. The real test of whether 
search-matching theory offers any value added lies in testing whether coefficients  3 β  and  4 β  
are significantly different from zero, with the signs predicted by search-matching theory.  
 
3. Data and Estimation 
Firm specific variables are taken from a firm-level dataset provided by Statistics Sweden and 
administered by Sveriges Riksbank. This dataset contains annual information for the years 
1990-2000 on all Swedish industrial firms with 20 or more employees and a sample of 
smaller firms. The database is constructed by merging information from several sources: 
Registry Based Labor Market Statistics (RAMS), Survey Based Statistics for Industrial Plants 
(Industristatistiken ) and Survey Based Statistics for Firms (Finansstatistiken 1990-1996,  
Företagsstatistiken 1997-2000). Since we want to identify the labor market area where the 
firm is situated, we consider only firms with a single plant, which do not move during the 
sample period. To construct our demand index we use the export share of the firm, and this is 
available only for firms with 50 employees or more.
12 We use only data for firms for which 
we have all the relevant information and these constraints limit the sample, leaving us with a 
sample of 461 ongoing firms.  The following variables are included in the equation: 
Employment  t i N ,  is the average number of workers employed in firm i in year t. 
Real wage cost is  ,, ln ln
C
it it WP −  where  t i W , is the firms’ total labor cost per employee 
(including wage and e.g. collective fees). A firm-specific competitor price for firm i in 
industry j is calculated as  ,, , ln (1 )ln ln
CD I C
it i jt i jt PP P δδ =− + , where  i δ  is the average export 
share over the sample period for firm i and 
D
t j P ,  is the industry-level producer price index for 
the domestic market (i. e. domestic deliveries plus imports, SNI92 two-digit industry 
                                                 
10See e.g. Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
11 E.g. Pissarides (2000) does not consider the case where there is imperfect competition in the goods market. 
12 An alternative would be to use the export share for the industry but this is less appealing because export shares 
vary substantially between firms within an industry.   8
classification). The international competitors’ price is calculated as 
) ln (ln ln , , , , ,
F




t j P E P + =∑ω , where  m j, ω  is the average share of industry j’s  exports 
that went to country m during 1990-1994 ( }, 38 ,.., 32   , 31 { ∈ j  SNI69 industry classification). 
These shares are computed using the available trade data for the classification of goods 
(varusni69) matching the SNI69 industry (production) classification. The countries, indexed 
m, are Sweden’s 13 main trading partners.
13  The competitor product price in foreign 
currency, 
F
t m j P , , , is the implicit value-added deflator for industry j in country m taken from the 
OECD industrial database STAN.  t m E ,  is the exchange rate (SEK per country m’s currency) 
taken from the OECD Annual National Accounts.  
The demand variable for firm i in sector j is constructed as 
, , ln (1 )[ ln ln (1 )ln ]
CI C I I
it i j t j t j j t i jt DC I Y D δφ φ φ φ δ =− + +− − + , where  i δ  is again the firm’s 
average export share, 
C
j φ  is the industry specific share of output going to final consumption in 
total domestic use, 
I




j φ φ − − 1  is the 
corresponding share used as intermediate goods (SNI92 two-digit industry classification). 
These shares are computed as the average value from the 1995 and 2000 Input-Output tables 
provided by Statistics Sweden. Y, C, and I are all aggregate variables.  t Y  is a volume index of 
industrial production,   t C  is real private consumption and  t I  is real private sector gross fixed 




t j Y D , , , , ln ln ∑ = ω , 
where  t m j Y , ,  is real value-added for industry j in country m taken from the OECD industrial 
database STAN and used as proxy for industry demand; the weights are defined above. 
Unemployment  t n U ,  is defined as the total number of unemployed workers in the 
local labor market area n and is provided by Swedish Labour Market Board (AMS). Local 
labor market areas consist of one or more municipalities and are constructed by Statistics 
Sweden using commuting patterns. We use the 1993 definition with 109 labor market areas. 
According to Johansson and Persson (2000), 80-90 percent of hired workers come from the 
local labor market area.   
Vacancies  t n V ,  in the local labor market area are constructed using monthly vacancy 
data from the Swedish Labour Market Board (AMS), which measures the number of unfilled 
                                                 
13 That is, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Denmark, USA, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Finland and Austria. These countries absorb about 80 percent of Sweden’s exports.    9
vacancies at the start of the month in each local labor market area. We take the average over 
the year as our measure of vacancies.  
 For  productivity we constructed a firm-specific productivity trend as  t iT τ  where 
)) / ln( ) / (ln( 1990 , 1990 , 2000 , 2000 , i i i i i N Y N Y − = τ ,  t , i Y  is the firm’s real sales and  t T  is a linear 
time trend. 
Table 1 shows how firms in the sample are distributed across industries.  We also 
see that export shares and the composition of demand vary considerably across industries. 
 
Table 1.  Industry Distribution of Firms in the Sample. Average Export Share and Share 
Used for Consumption, Investment and Intermediate Goods for each Industry 
Industry 
(SNI92) 
Number of firms  Average export 
share 
Consumption Investment Intermediate 
15  22  0.11  0.58 0 0.42 
16  0  0.06  1 0 0 
17  15  0.63  0.28 0 0.72 
18 7 0.79  0.89 0 0.11 
19 4 0.73  0.39 0 0.61 
20  44  0.52  0.02 0 0.98 
21  22  0.65  0.03 0 0.97 
22  18  0.04  0.16 0 0.84 
23 3 0.50  0.40 0 0.60 
24  19  0.69  0.28 0 0.72 
25  26  0.52  0.07 0 0.93 
26 5 0.30  0.03 0 0.97 
27  17  0.54  0.01 0 0.99 
28  68  0.28 0.02 0.14 0.84 
29  92  0.64 0.02 0.40 0.58 
30  4  0.74 0.04 0.80 0.16 
31  9  0.70 0.06 0.17 0.77 
32  7  0.78 0.04 0.35 0.61 
33  12  0.62 0.02 0.49 0.49 
34  28  0.66 0.28 0.20 0.52 
35 9 0.69  0.12 0 0.88 
36  29  0.46 0.38 0.20 0.42 
37  1 0 0 0 1 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the severity of the Swedish recession, with investment and consumption 
falling substantially in 1992-1993. Figure 2 shows that the large depreciation of the currency 
in 1992-1993 had a substantial effect on real wage cost (competitiveness) in the machine 
industry, with a 64 percent export share, but did not much affect the food industry, with an 11 
percent export share. Figure 3 shows that there is considerable co movement of 
unemployment rates across local labor markets, but also a non negligible cross-sectional 
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Figure 1:  Changes in Demand Components 
Change in Domestic Consumption, Investment and Production, and International Demand 

















Figure 2:  Changes in Real Wage Cost  
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Note:  The local labor market areas used for this illustration are Stockholm (llc=1), Gnosjö (llc=8),  
Malmö (llc=32), Göteborg (llc=38) and Örnsköldsvik (llc=86).  
 
 
Figure 4:  Change in Vacancies for some Local Labor Markets 
 
Note:  The local labor market areas used for this illustration are Stockholm (llc=1), Gnosjö (llc=8),  
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  llc = 1 llc = 8
llc = 32 llc = 38
llc = 86  12
By regressing our variables on time dummies, we can find out how much of the variation that 
is cross sectional. Time dummies explain 14 percent of the change in real wage costs, 83 
percent of the change in demand, 86 percent of changes in regional unemployment rates, and 
30 percent of changes in vacancies. Thus, about the same fraction of the variation is cross-
sectional for unemployment changes as for demand changes. 
Can we plausibly identify the effects we are interested in?  The main problem is that 
shocks, which affect employment in many firms, may affect wages and aggregate demand as 
well as unemployment and vacancies in the local labor market area. The shock  , it ε  in equation 
(6) may have aggregate, industry-specific, and local components. We include time dummies 
which absorb the effects of aggregate shocks. Industry-specific shocks are dealt with by not 
relying on industry-specific time series data to construct demand indices but constructing this 
variable from aggregate data as described above.
14  The industry price, which is used to 
calculate the real wage cost, is instrumented using suitably chosen lags (see discussion 
below). To deal with simultaneity arising from local shocks, we instrument local 
unemployment and vacancies by demand and (lags of) competitors’ price indexes which 
reflect the industry structure in the local labor market area.  
A demand variable for the local labor market n is constructed as 
,, , ln ln nt jn jt
j
DD κ =∑  where the weights  , jn κ  reflect the local labor market’s industry 
composition (SNI92 two-digit industry classification). These weights are constructed by using 
RAMS data on the number of employees in each sector (by local labor market SNI92 two-
digit industry classification). Industry demand is calculated as 
, , ln (1 )[ ln ln (1 )ln ]
CI C I I
jt j j t j t j j t j jt DC IY D δφ φ φ φ δ =− + +− − +  where  j δ  is now the industry’s 
average export share. 
Local competitors’ price is constructed analogously as 





PP κ =∑  
where ,, , ln (1 )ln ln
CD I C
jt j jt j jt PP P δδ =− + . 
By using instruments for vacancies, we also deal with the problem of measurement 
errors in vacancy data. As is well known, many job openings are not officially registered, so 
vacancies are a relatively poor measure of the number of job openings. 
Wage data may also suffer from measurement problems because of composition 
effects and variation in hours. Also, wages and prices may be simultaneously determined. We 
                                                 
14 We assume that unobserved world-wide industry shocks are unimportant.   13
therefore use lagged values of the real wage cost variable, 
C
t i t i P W , , ln ln − , as instruments for 
the real wage cost. 
Since our empirical specification includes lagged dependent variables as well as 
fixed effects, we use an Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator.
15  Thus, fixed effects are eliminated 
by taking first differences. This procedure introduces an MA(1) process in the residual 
( t i, ε ∆ ), so that the first difference of the lagged dependent variable and the residual are 
correlated. But provided that  t i, ε  is not serially correlated, we can use (suitably chosen) lags 
of the dependent variable as instruments.  
As is generally the case for an asymptotically efficient GMM estimator, the 
instrument set grows with the number of time periods. However, as the lag order increases, 
lags become less informative as instruments. To avoid including irrelevant instruments, it is 
sensible not to include the full history of lags. We do not use instruments further back than 
five years relative to the variable that is to be instrumented. The results are not sensitive to 
including the full history of lags, however. Taking account of all the considerations above, we 
chose the instrument set listed in Table 2. 
 
4. Results  
When we estimate equation (6) as it stands, the AR(2)-test indicates that we have a problem 
with second-order serial dependence in the residuals. Our stylized theoretical models may not 
fully capture the dynamic adjustment, or there may be some omitted variables. By including 
two additional lags of employment in the regressions we are able to remove any signs of serial 
dependence in the residual.
16  The Hansen test does not reject the joint hypothesis that the 
model is correctly specified and that the instruments are valid. Examining the relevance of the 
instrument set, we find that the partial R
2:s are 0.56 for unemployment, 0.32 for vacancies, 
and 0.08 for real wage cost.
17 Thus, we should keep in mind that the relevance of the 
instrument set is somewhat low for the real wage cost. 
Table 2 shows the results.  
 
 
                                                 
15 We have also tried using the System-GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). However, the 
Hansen test indicates that the data does not square well with the restrictions imposed on the initial conditions 
process.  
16 We cannot eliminate the serial dependence mentioned above by adding lags of any other explanatory variable 
than employment. 
17 The relevance statistics are calculated using a static instrument set.   14
Table 2: Results  
Dependent variable:  , ln it N ∆  
 I  II  III  IV  V 
Estimation  method  GMM GMM GMM GMM OLS 
C





















t i D , ln    0.302** 




























































































Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period  1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1993-2000 
Number  of  obs.  3227 3227 3227 3227 3688 
AR(2)  (P-value)  0.197 0.163 0.170 0.144 - 
Hansen(P-value)  0.301 0.168 0.263 0.374 - 
Note:  The sample is 461 firms.  ** and * denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. The 
estimation in columns I-IV is performed using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator calculated with 
DPD 1.21 for Ox. The GMM-type instruments used are:   s t i N − , ln  where s = 2, …,5, 
C
t i t i P W , , ln ln −  where 
s=2, …,5, 
C
s t n P − , ln  where s = 2, 3, …,6,  s t n D − , ln  where s = 0, …,6.  t i D , ln is treated as exogenous and we 
treat the productivity trend as deterministic. Second-step coefficients with robust Windmeijer (2005) finite-
sample corrected standard errors in parenthesis. AR (2) denotes the p-value for the test of second-order 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. Hansen denotes the p-value of the joint test of the model 
specification and instrument validity.  The estimation in column V is performed using the OLS within estimator 
and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
Column I shows the results for a pure labor demand model. This model is supported by the 
data. Real wage cost and demand have the expected effects on job creation and both 
coefficients are highly significant. Since both variables are relatively crude proxies for the 
true costs and demand, the estimated coefficients are likely to understate the importance of 
these factors.
18  
                                                 
18 According to the theoretical models, the correct variables would be weighted averages of current and expected 
future demand and real-wage costs, demand is measured using industry rather than firm-level export 
composition, wage data does not take account of variation in hours etc.   15
In contrast, the search-matching model in Column II is not consistent with the data: 
unemployment and vacancies have insignificant effects on job creation. Column III shows the 
results for the encompassing model. These results only confirm the results for the labor 
demand model. Thus we find no evidence that unemployed workers contribute to matches 
being formed. When we model employment changes in individual firms, we do not gain any 
explanatory power by including the variables suggested by search-matching theory.
19  
Our theoretical models have relatively simple dynamics.  To allow for more 
complicated dynamics, we estimate the model including one additional lag on real wage cost, 
demand, unemployment and vacancies.  As seen in Column IV in Table 2, the only lag that is 
significant is lagged demand. The coefficient is almost as large as the contemporary effect, 
but with opposite sign, implying an essentially immediate effect of a demand shock on 
employment. One interpretation of this result is that customer relations are important in the 
product market. Customer market theory offers a natural explanation why demand effects are 
immediate but price effects take time.
20 
To test whether our results are sensitive to our choice of estimation method, we also 
estimate the model by OLS using a within transformation to handle fixed effects. Column V 
in Table 2 shows the results.  Wages and demand have significant effects, but the coefficients 
are somewhat smaller compared to the GMM estimates.  This may be due to measurement 
errors for wages, in which case all the coefficients in the regression will be biased.   
One possible objection against the results in Table 2 is that some firms may cater 
mainly to the local labor market. If so, local-demand and competitiveness variables  , ln nt D  
and  , ln
C
nt P  are invalid instruments because they actually belong in the equation. Suppose that 
some firms in the local labor market area are hit by negative shocks and local unemployment 
increases. If firm i is a sub-contractor, or caters to the employees of those firms, it will also 
reduce employment. If the true coefficient for unemployment is positive, this will bias the 
                                                 
19 Obviously, unemployment and vacancies depend on demand and wages, but this is a problem only if the 
correlation is so high that there is a multicollinearity problem. The highly significant coefficients for the latter 
variables suggest that this is not the case.  
20 Following Gottfries (2002), let a firm’s customer stock x  be determined by  ( ) () ,, 1 , , 1
c
it it it it x xp p λλ η − =− − − , 
where, η is the long run elasticity, and λ is the speed of adjustment of the customer stock. All variables are logs. 
Suppose further that each customer buys  ( ) exp t d σ units and there is constant returns to scale so the log of 
employment equals production:  ,, it it t nx d σ =+ . Let the price be set according to  () ,, ,,
cc
it it w it it ppa wp −= − . 
Then we can easily derive the following equation for employment: 
() () , , , , ,1 ,1 1
c
it w it it it it it na w p d d n λη σ σ λ λ − − ∆= − − + − − − . Gottfries (2002, Table 1) estimated  2.88 η = , 
0.37 w a = , and λ corresponding to 0.28 on a yearly frequency. These results are qualitatively in line with the 
results in Column IV.   16
coefficient towards zero. One way to check whether such local interdependencies affect the 
results is to limit the analysis to firms with a substantial export share. Such firms should be 
less dependent on local demand conditions, so the estimated coefficient on local 
unemployment should be less biased. Estimating equations for firms with substantial export 
shares, e. g. 25 or 50 percent, we still do not find any significantly positive effect of local 
unemployment on net job creation. 
   
5. Comparisons with Other Results 
An earlier paper that tries to distinguish empirically between search and labor demand models 
is Burgess (1993). His paper is, in spirit, similar to ours and he claims support for the search-
matching model. The results are hard to compare, however, because his specification is 
fundamentally different from ours. First, he uses aggregate data and estimates a time series 
model with a large number of explanatory variables. Second, he argues that the key 
implication of search-matching is that hiring costs depend on the state of the labor market. A 
slack labor market will reduce hiring costs and speed up the adjustment towards the desired 
level of employment. Thus he tests for interaction effects between labor market tightness and 
the gap between desired and actual employment. This is reasonable when the desired 
employment adjustment is positive (hiring) but makes little sense when the desired 
employment change is negative. Also, it different from the standard search matching model, 
where labor market slack, by itself, makes it more profitable to open vacancies.  
Another related literature is concerned with the labor-market impact of immigration.  
Card (1990) and others exploit geographical differences in immigration and find small effects 
of immigration on wages and job opportunities for natives in local labor markets. Taken at 
face value, such results suggest that supply does indeed create its own demand. But an 
increase in immigration obviously increases both supply and demand in the local labor 
market. Further, as emphasized by Borjas (2003), there is a serious simultaneity problem 
because immigrants are attracted to regions where there are many jobs. In our view, these 
results are not directly comparable to ours, which are primarily concerned with cyclical 
fluctuations.  
A large number of studies have estimated “matching functions” and found a positive 
effect of unemployment on hiring (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an overview). 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), for example, estimate a matching function and conclude that 
”employment is not simply determined by demand” (p.4). Does the empirical success of the 
matching function contradict our findings?  In our view it does not because an estimated   17
matching function says very little about how employment adjustment actually comes about. 
Most labor market theories imply that unemployment tends to revert to some natural rate, so 
hiring tends to be high when unemployment is high. In a regression of hiring on 
unemployment we should expect a positive coefficient – independently of which is the correct 
theory of the labor market. If we include vacancies in the regression, the coefficient on 
unemployment should fall but remain positive because vacancies are a very imperfect 
measure of actual job openings. Thus, every labor market theory predicts positive coefficients 
in a regression of hiring on unemployment and vacancies. Most theories would also imply 
constant returns to scale: hiring is twice as high in a labor market that is twice as big. So an 
estimated matching function does not say much about the importance of search frictions in the 
labor market.
21  
To separate different labor market theories, we need to know whether employment 
adjustment occurs because wages fall when unemployment is high, because of changes in 
aggregate demand and exchange rates, or because search by unemployed workers in itself 
contributes to more jobs being filled. We tried to separate these factors and we found clear 
effects of wages and demand.
22  There was no evidence that unemployment has a direct effect 
on job creation.
23  
We should note, however, that the Swedish labor market was very weak in the 
1990s. Open unemployment went up to 8 percent, with another 5 percent in labor market 
programs. Matching problems may be more important in a tight labor market and to 
investigate this is an interesting avenue for future research. Still, our results suggest that more 
attention to the demand side is needed if search-matching models are to be useful for 




                                                 
21 Since we do not have vacancy data for individual firms, we cannot replicate matching-function estimates using 
this dataset. 
22 Blanchard and Diamond (1989) motivate the omission of  wages from the estimated matching function by 
assuming that “wages play no allocational role in individual matches, merely dividing rents between firms and 
workers”. Our results indicate an important allocative role of wages. Gottfries (1992), Oswald (1993), Holden 
(1994), Gottfries-Sjöström (1999) and Eriksson-Gottfries (2005) provide arguments why wages are rigid and 
play an allocative role. 
23 There is also a recent literature that investigates whether the search-matching model is capable of generating 
the observed cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Shimer (2005) finds that the standard search-
matching model with continuously renegotiated wages cannot explain such variation.  If wages are assumed to 
be sticky, the fit of the model improves significantly (Shimer (2004)). However, this literature is concerned with 
wage setting rather than the importance of search-frictions in the labor market.   18
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Appendix. Derivation of the Job Creation Equations 
 
The Labor Demand Model: 
This derivation follows Sargent (1979) closely. Using the constraint to eliminate  τ , i P  in the 
objective function and taking the first-order condition for period t we get: 
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By the law of iterated expectations, this holds if we take expectations at time t for future 
periods. Since this is linear we can solve the problem as if future variables were known with 
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One can show that the same expression holds for period t. 
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The Search-Matching Model 
Using the constraint to eliminate  τ , i V  in the objective function and maximizing with respect to 
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Using the same conditions for subsequent periods and the law of iterated expectations we can 
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